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Abstract: The realrate ofreturn on inflation-indexed governmentsecurities
is calculated and published as ifindexation succeeded perfectly in keeping
the real value of coupon and principal payments unchanged. In fact the
procedure of indexing to the lagged momentum of the seasonally unad
justed cPi gives rise to three types ofindexation bias that may change the
expected real value ofthe future stream ofpayments in relation to the cur
rent par value. These biases are due to i) seasonality, ji) non-seasonal
fluctuations in reported inflation rates, and iii) any expected “permanent”
changes in future rates ofinflation (or the reporting thereof) being capable
of creating predictable changes in the real value of the inflation-adjusted
principal with the indexation procedure actually in force. They are one
more, directly quantifiable, reason why the reported yields do not provide
the long-sought definite revelation ofthe riskless real rate ofinterest and
hence ofthe expected rate ofinflation by comparison with nominal interest
rates.
Resumen: La tasa real de retorno de valores gubernamentales indexados a
la inflación se calcula y publica como si la indexación mantuviera perfec
tamente el valor real del pago del cupón y principal. El método de indexa
ción al rezago del iPc no ajustado por estacionalidad genera tres tipos de
sesgo, que pueden cambiar el valor real esperado del flujo futuro de pagos
en relación con el valor actual “a la par”. Esto se debe a i) la estacionalidad,
u) las fluctuaciones no estacionales en tasas de inflación reportadas, y
iii) cualquier cambio «permanente” esperado en tasas de inflación futuras
que pueda crear cambios predecibles en el valorreal del principal, ajustado
por inflación por el procedimiento en curso de indexación. Estas son una
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razón más, directamente cuantificable, por la cual los retornos reportados
no dan la buscada revelación de largo plazo de la tasa de interés real libre
de riesgo, y por lo tanto de la tasa esperada de inflación en comparación
con las tasas de interés nominal.
1. Motivation
I
n theory, the concept ofthe real rate ofreturn appears simple enough
in continuous time and even in discrete time: Given a price index,
p*, that is perfect for the agent’s purpose (e.g., for long-term accumu
lation of purchasing power) and final in the sense of not ever being
subject to revision, all that needs to be done is to divide the gross
nominal return from period t to t + j by (P + /P)*. Ifthe gross nominal
rate of return is fixed, as it might be on a risk-free standard debt
contract, the real rate ofreturn on the face value ofthat contract would
fluctuate inversely with the inflation rate. When dealing with a con
tract with a fixed real rather than nominal coupon rate, we could turn
this procedure around and determine the corresponding gross nominal
rate by multiplying the fixed gross real rate by (P +jP)*, still assum
ing, ofcourse, that the correct price indexes are available with finality
andwithout lags. The gross nominal rate ofreturn would then fluctuate
directly and preciselywith the gross inflation rate to keep the real rate
ofreturn on the original investment ahd its inflation-adjustedparvalue
constant as promised.
In actuality, there is a trade-offbetween the finality and suitabil
ity of price indexes. In addition such indexes, even if never revised,
are published only with a lag of k weeks or months. Then, instead of
multiplying by the ideal, instantly revealed, price ratio eqyisioned in
theory, the actual multiplication is by P
+
- - k’ where P is a
seasonally unadjusted price index that is final but conceptually, and
notjust statistically, imperfect for the purpose on hand.
It turns out, therefore, that the inflation-indexed security — which
is billed as providing a real coupon rate ofreturn that is fixed — is, in
fact, providing a rate that is variable in relation to a more perfectly
indexed principal. The reason is that the indexation actually applied
is predictably imperfect to the extent sorne ofthe differences between
t+j-k’tk and (P+/P)* can already be anticipated at time t + j. Then
it would be inaccurate to attribute fluctuations in the market price of
this security relative to its imperfectly indexed par value as fully
revealing changes in the real rate ofreturn required in its market.
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Because changes in the required real rate ofreturn are crucial to
rnuch ofeconomic analysis — say, ofthe near-term impact ofrnonetary
policy, or ofsupply shocks, or ofinnovationsinfuture income and profit
expectations — an accurate measure and open signal ofthese changes
is desirable. This paper suggests that, without considerable effort at
rnaking necessary adjustments, changes in the real yield reported on
inflation-indexed securities do not provide the desired conclusive
identification. In particular, the longer the indexation lag ofthe secu
rity (which is partly a function of the frequency with which the
consumer price index [cPI] is reported), the more pronounced the sea
sonality ofthe seasonally unadjusted cri, the greater the risk that its
statistical derivation is changed, and the less even are the movernents
of the seasonally-adjusted cii over time in both the high-frequency
and the low-frequency domains, the more muddied is the identifica
tion ofthe real yield.
Although our own demonstration empirically will be limited to
the first year of experience with inflation-indexed securities in the
United States, we hope that the adjustment rnethodology developed
will be useful also for refining real-yield calculations in other coun
tries, particularly in Mexico. Beyond this, finance specialists ah over
the world may take note and see the yields officially reported on such
securities in a more discerning hight.
2. Introduction
First issued in January 1997, the U. S. Treasury’s Inflation-Indexed
Securities, popularly referred to as Inflation-Protection Securities
(TIPs), are an innovative addition to the menu offinancial assets. The
early months in the life ofany such security that brings new features
to the capital market are devoted to market testing and seasoning.
During this process, data on liquidity and depth of the market and
dealer participation develop, and volatility and covariance patterns of
returns are estabhished. These patterns reveal the niches which the
new security may occupy in portfolios and what, if any, contribution
it may make to the completion of asset markets.
Seasoning, however, also allows design features and idiosyncra
cies of the new security and its reported real yield to be understood
and to be priced out. To obtain an international perspective on the
design and yield characteristics of TIPS, we briefly compare them to
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the Mexican UDIBONOS, introduced in 1995, which, like TIPS, involve the
payment of half-yearly real interest on inflation-adjusted principal
and appear particularly well designed.
Because price index movements, as opposed to movements in
individual prices, can not be observed concurrently on account of the
sampling and processing time required, indexation even to a high-fre
quency index, such as the consumer price index, can not guarantee
maintenance of the real value ofprincipal on a current basis. We are
interested only in those conditions under which failure to do so
becomes predictable so that there is expected indexation bias under
defined conditions that should affect the reported yield in a measur
able way. Such bias arises both from the use of a price index with a
predictable seasonal component and from the use of lagged-momen
tum indexation.’ Imperfections from the latter source come to bear
either when there are blips in the inflation rate that can be recognized
as deviations from the underlying rate when they occur, or when a
permanent change in the rate ofinflation is in store for the future. An
anticipated regime change could presage such a change in inflation
fundamentals, as could an observed innovation in monthly infla
tion rates ifsuch rates are characterized by a moving-average process
so that they contain an element ofrandom walk.
While the possible importance ofindexation lags, particularly in
UK index-linked bonds, has been noted by others as described by Barr
and Campbell (1997, pp. 363-364), we offer a precise treatment on the
assumption that the underlying rate of inflation is known to market
Lagged indexation and lagged-momentum indexation are often confused. Lagged price
level indexation is involved, for instance, inco clauses that state that the corzact wage will
be raised 3 percent if, and soon after the time when, the reported consumer pnce index has risen
by at least 3 percent aboye the base level specified in the contract. In the United States as
elsewhere, tax brackets and social security benefits are subject to such lagged-Ievel indexation.
TIPS, like most traded inflation-protection securities in the world, work quite differently.
Instead ofthe par value sitting still while waiting tobe adjusted periodically by use ofthe lagged
cpi, they hit the ground running: Inflation adjustrnent starts the very next day after the issue
date, or dated date, ifdifferent, by applying the recently observed inflation momentum. As best
exemplified by Mexico’s Unidad de Inversión (uro), introduced in 1995, or Chile’s Unidad de
Fomento (UF), in use since 1967, changes in the money value of these units are driven by
lagged-momenturn indexation. Hence imperfections in indexation arise on these units only when
the currently observedinflationrate differs from the lagged inflationrateenteringthe indexation
process.
With lagged-level as opposed to lagged-momenturn indexation, on the other hand, index
ation would be imperfect whenever the current inflationrate is anything other than zero. Kandel,
Ofer and Sarig (1996, pp. 207-209) model the derivation ofthe ex-ante real interest rate in an
environment oflagged-level indexation where sorne fraction ofthe bond payments is not indexed
and therefore discounted at a nominal interest rate.
participants from a univariate forecasting process. We also offer
concrete first estimates ofseasonal indexation bias on the assumption
that investors expect the seasonal pattern ofthe consumer price index
to be stable. Before getting to this, we contrast specific features ofTIPS
with those of similar securities widely issued in other countries,
particularly in Mexico, to assess the design ofthe TIPS from a compara
tive perspective and to submit tentative recommendations in this
regard. This is the first purpose ofthe present paper.
The second, more central, purpose is to alert future users of the
series ofreal yields reported on TIPS and similar securities throughout
the worldthat the reported yield will have a seasonal component, react
to inflation surprises that are revealed with a lag, and react to news
about impending changes in the monetary regime or the inflation
target. The fortunes ofinvestors in such “real-valued’ securities thus
can not be separated from the outlook for inflation. Nor can they be
separated from its official measure. Rather, the reported yield is bound
to react to news about revisions in statistical procedures that predic
tably change the measure of inflation when the true rate of inflation
is unchanged. Our method is designed to calibrate the size of the
reactions that can reasonably be attributed to these factors beforehand
sothat reported yields can be adjusted for sorne or all ofthem, as shown
in this paper.
An alternative future use that will become possible as the time
series lengthens will be to add the factors producing indexation bias
to the list of explanatory variables of the reported real yield, rather
than to adjustthat yield directly. This would mean entering i) seasonal
dumrnies, ji) monthly inflation-surprise factors, such as ln[E
-1 (P 1 - -
(p_, 1 _ 2 )], constructed from the latest cri report on the price level for
the prior rnonth(P 1 ,), and iii) expected future changes in inflation
rates (Ap 1+) weighted by that fraction, , of a year that is equal to the
lagin indexation mornentum and discounted at the real discountfactor
R,ü =,>RE 1 (Ap + 1). into equations purportingto explainrealinterest
rates. Such reduced-form equations typically have contained distrib
uted lags of the real interest rate, of (oil price) supply shocks, and of
demand shocks, such as rnoney-supply surprises, as recently surveyed
by Bischoff (1998). If the real yield on TIPS should be used as the
regressor in such equations in the future, our procedure would ex
plain what adjustment factors would need to be included and what
—judging by the size ofmeasurable indexation biases alone, without
allowance for the attendant risks that would need to be compensated
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also — the range of reasonable coefficient estimates on such factors
would be.
3. Review ofthe Instruments
and ofthe Calculation oftheir Yield
During recent years, both Mexico and the United States have intro
duced new cpI-indexed government securities known, respectively, as
UDIBONOS 2 and TIPS. Comparingthe construction and valuation ofthese
instruments provides insights into the quality oftheir design and the
appropriateness of the real yields reported before the indexation
biases affecting these rates are analyzed.
Unlike TIPS, UDIBONOS are specified in real investment units (uDIs)
whose daily exchange rate (BdM, 1996b, p. 3: “tipo de cambio peso
UDI”) with the new peso is announced by the central bank, rather than
in inflation-adjusted nominal units. 3 Nevertheless it is fitting to use
UDIBONOS as a comparator for TIPS since the real-yield calculations
officially prescribed for ach of these instruments involve only real
magnitudes. Neither yield-calculation formula makes reference to the
imperfect indexation process actually applied nor recognizes that
there may be predictable changes in the real value of principal for
which investors expect to be compensated.
3.1. Mexican Instruments Denominated in Real Units
While the introduction of TIPS was unrelated to any pressing need, in
Mexico instruments denominated in uDIs were first created in 1995
in response to widespread debt-service problems. These problems
were associated with the high nominal interest rates and implied
accelerated real amortization that occurred soon after the external
value of the peso had come under intense downward pressure in
December 1994. The inflation rate reached 52 percent per annum
in the ensuing exchange-rate, intermediation, and then general eco
nomic crisis (BdM, 1995b; 1996a, pp. 168-169, 231-232; 1997, p. 251).
Thus, on April 4, 1995, the Banco de México (BdM) authorized “credit
institutions to denominate their deposit liabilities with maturities
exceeding three months, and credit operations ofany term, in Invest
ment Units and to establish a scheme of short and long positions on
assets and liabilities linked to the National Consumer Price Index”
(BdM, 1995a, p. 184; see also BdM, 1996a, pp. 231-232). Since that
date, the BdM has been required to publish every fortnight (15 days)
in Diario Oficial the daily values of UDIS in local currency for an
equivalent period ahead (BdM, 1995a, p. 185; 1995b).
At yearend 1996, nonfederal credits restructured in unis had a
current parvalue equal to almost 7% ofMexico’s 1996 GDP (BdM, 1997,
p. 150), and UDI had become a denomination option not only for bank
deposits and (restructured) loans to business but also for notes issued
bythe federal government (BdM, 1996b). Obviously Mexico, like Chile
before it, but unlike the United States, is building a deep financial
sterling and the Australian dollar, which use 365 days (Grabbe, 1996, p. 106). It does not apply
to TIPS where the semi-annual coupon rate is paid simply at half the annual rate.
In Mexico, at the end of1996, the federal government’s domestic debtsecurities ofN$160.8
billion included ajustabonos ofN$25.4 billion and UDIBONOS valued at N$5.4 billion. cpi-indexed
securities thus amounted to 19% ofdomestic federal debt, and 90% ofthese securities were heid
by firms and households (BdM, 1997, p. 283).
2 UDIBONOS stands for bonos de desarrollo del gobierno federal denominados en unidades
de inversión (uDI). From May 1996 to March 1997, the real yield on the 3 to 5 year UDIBONOS
themselves has followed an up and down pattern (in percent): 7.13, 7.52, 8.61, 8.35, 8.42, 7.81,
7.46, 6.88, 6.63, 6.32, 6.46 (BdM, 1997, p. 267) with a range of 229 basis points. In Chile, almost
ah debt with maturitiesin excess of90 days thatis heid bythe central bank is indexed (Budnevich
and Hurtubia, 1997), and the real interest rate in UF has been between 6.08 and 6.47 percent on
8 to 10 year PRCs (Pagarés Reajustables con Cupones) over the same penod, still about twice as
high as the yield required on TIPS in the United States. Cóté et al. (1996, p. 51) plot long-term
real return government bond yields for Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom for
1992-1996.
Unlike the United States, neither Chile nor Mexico taxes the indexation gain on principal,
and this tax treatment is consistent with their restricting the taxation of nominal interest
(presumptively) to the ex post real component as well. In Mexico, a net tax bias in favor ofthe
yield on UDIBONOS nevertheless exists: BdM (1995b, p. 12) explains that while unindexed debt
securities are subject to a fiat 20 percent tax on the first 10 percentage points ofnninal interest,
only the real interest on imi, which has been less than 10 percent, is taxable, and the tax rate is
a favorable 15 percent.
¿ The Mexican government has issued infiation-indexed securities in the 3 to 5 year
maturity range for years. Since July 20, 1989, the federal government of Mexico has issued
ajustabonos (bonos ajustables del gobierno federal) which are peso-denominated instruments
whose principal, for calculating principal repayment and interest accrual, is indexed to the
consumer price index (JNPc). These 3-year (3 x 364 = 1 092 days) to 5-year (5 x 364 = 1 820 days,
issued since November 22, 1990) instruments pay real interest quarterly. Interest rates on
ajustabonos have fallen from their initial high of 16.33% in 1989 to as little as 3.20% in 1992
(BdM, 1995, p. 220). An annual coupon ofx% is paid out as 91/360 times x% quarterly, just as
an annual coupon of y% on IJDIBONOS is paid out as 182/360 times y% semiannually. (For a
technical description see the 18-page manual issued by the Asociación Mexicana de Casas de
Bolsa, n.d.)
The convention cf quoting interest rates on a 30-day per month, 360-day per year basis
conforms to the convention ofthe International Association of Bond Dealers (lSD). It also apphies
to most short-term eurocurrency contracts, with the exception of those denominated in pound
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infrastructure for a standardized indexed denomination and the in
struments based on it. Competition with hard-currency foreign assets
may demand it.
As UDIBONOS represent Mexico’s most recent entry in the market
for real-valued government notes, they may be compared with the
introduction ofTIPS soon thereafter. Indeed, there is much to be learned
from such a comparison about the appropriate design of indexed
investment units and the degree to which they correspond to the
economic concept ofinflation-protection securities.
3.2. Calculation ofthe Real Rate ofYield on UDIBONOS and TIFS,
and Unit Design
Both the Mexican and U. S. calculation ofthe annual real rate ofyield
to maturity, R, of purchasing 1 unit of these unamortized securities
—with coupons fixedatthe annualrate C andwith h beingthe fraction
of this coupon that is paid semiannually for a total of n prospective
coupon due dates remaining on the issue — follow the same basic
approach but differ in details of exposition and substance. The ba
sic approach is to account for the current real-valued market value
(MV) with the discounted real coupon payments remaining to matur
ity (SDC) plus the discounted value ofthe original real-valued princi
pal due atmaturity (DP) minus any accrued real interest due the seller
(Al). fn both countries’ expositions, discountingis first done to thevery
next coupon payment due date. The resulting sum, SDC + DP, is then
discounted further by the additional discount factor (ADF’) for the
number ofdays remaining from the date ofsettlement or yiluation to
the next coupon date (L — T). Al is due to seller who has alrady earned
accrued interest from the previous coupon date (or dated date) to the
date of settlement or valuation for a total of T days out ofthe coupon
period of length L days. Hence, the internal real rate of return, R, is
implied by the equation:
MV=(SDC÷DP)/ADF - Al.
discount factor, and the U. S. Treasury employing linear interpolation
within the current coupón period in progress to establish the real rate
of yield bid at auction. However, the yield reported on TIPS in the
financial press is calculated by using interest compounded daily, as in
Mexico. Differences between Mexico and the United States in the
definition of h and L affect the calculations of SDC and ADF, as well
as of DP. Al involves linear interpolation in both countries, with the
market price quoted on this basis. 4 Differences in equations (4) and (5)
below are purely expositional. We prefer the Mexican rendition since
the U. S. use ofn in lieu of n-1 and of the intermediary variable a*
somewhat complicate the exposition. In Mexico, n is defined simply as
the number ofcoupon due dates ahead (número de cupones por cortar,
incluyendo elvigente) while the official U. S. definition ofn* is difficult
to follow (see U. S. Government, 1997, p. 346).
SDC = hC + (C/R)[1 — (1 + hR)--’]
DP = (1 + hR)-
- 1)
For UDIBONOS and TIPS there are certain differences in the calcu
lation of SDC and ADF which are highlighted in several of the
equations (2) through (8) below. The formula used for ADF differs for
Mexico, where an exponential construction is used for the part-period
Dealers quote a gross price including accrued interest, so that the market pnce is
obtained by subtraction ofaccrued interest from what is known in the trade as the “dirty” price.
Hence any change in the calculation of accrued interest would be reflected in the reported (net)
market price. For this reason, no such change is made here even though exponential accrual
would be preferable (e.g., for precision in taxation) to the linear formula actually in use.
Mexico
(2)
SDC + DP = hC + dR +
U. S.
(3)
(1 — C/R)(1 + hR)--’ ‘ — 182/360 ‘ ‘MX
SDC + DP = hC + hC(a*) + (1 + hR)*,
Mexico
(4)
an* E [1 — (1 + hR)*j/hR, n* = n — 1, = 1/2
ADF = (1 +hR) 1 - T ,L= 182 days
(5)
(1)
U. ADF = (1 +hR)’- T , vanes (181 — 184 days)
U. S•Federaigovernmentealculation ADF = 1 + hR(1 — TÍL)
(6)
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Mexico: h = 182/360, L = 182 :. hT/L = T/360; U.S.: h = 112, L = actual
number ofdays in current semiannual coupon period, say from January
15 to July 15 (181 days, 182 in leap years) and July 15 to January 15 (184
days). T = the number of days from the last coupon date (or dated date
in the first coupon period) to the settlement date.
The practice ofdefiningthe original term to maturity in multiples
of 182 days and to deduce semiannual coupon payments by multipli
cation by 182/360 from the 360-day coupon rate is common interna
tionally for short- and medium-term issues and conforms to guidelines
of the International Association of Bond Dealers. The U. S. procedu
re of spanning whole calendar years appears preferable, particularly
for instruments with original maturities of more than four years.
However, the U. S. practice ofmaking half-yearly coupon payments at
exactly halfthe annual rate on the same daily date ofthe month, even
though the length of coupon periods may then differ by as much as
three days, 5 is less precise than the Mexican procedure of dealing in
standardized halfyears of 182 days each. Nevertheless, we settle for
the U. S. definitions ofT, L and h, such that L is the actual number of
days in the current coupon period but h remains 1/2.
4. Review of Calculation ofthe Daily
Inflation-Adjusted Principal of UDIBONOS and TTPS
Although the yield on both UDIBONOS and TIPS is calculated in real
terms, settlement is made in national currency in both countries. TIPS
contracts, like the earlier ajustabonos in Mexico, are stated in nominal
units and can be settled only by determining the cPi-adjustd equiva
lent oftheir real issue price.
4.1. UDIBONOS
As explained in BdM (1995a, p. 34), the sampling-period and price
index-calculation lags reflected in the announced values of the UDI
Greater precision in h could be achieved by leaving the daily coupon due dates the same
as the daily date ofthe issue, but making the semiannual coupon payment equal to a fraction of
the annual coupon rate given by the actualnumber ofcalendar days in the coupon period, divided
by the numbei ofdays (365 or 366) in the “year” ofthe note in which the coupon payment occurs.
which are subject to daily changes from the moment they were first
created on April 4, 1995,-are as follows:
The series of UDI values is extended twice each month by use of
theci values reported twice per month. The price level, 1ht’ sampled
in the first half of any month t, dates 1 through 15, must be reported
no later than by the 25th day of that month t; the price level, 2ht’
sampled in the second half of that same month t, dates 16 through
28-31, depending on the month, must be reported nolatethan by the
lOth day ofthe following month, t + 1. Assume the value ofthe UDI Qn
that date isUDI 10 Thenthevalue ofthe UDIthatmustbe announced
no later than by the lOth day ofeach month forthe succeeding 15 days
(11 through 25) is such that the value on the last day ofthis period is
UDI 25 +1 = UDI 10 + 1(2h/1h)• All the daily values announced for the
UDI during this interval grow at the constant percentage rate implied
by repeated application of the fixed factor of(2h/1ht)’ to generate
successive daily values over the 15-day period from the 1lth through
the 25th ofmonth t + 1.
Because the rate ofchange in the urn from the lOth to the 25th of
each month (centered on day 17 ofmonth t + 1) reflects the behavior
of prices from the first to the second half (centered on day 15) of
the prior month, the lag in the application ofthe latest reading on the
inflation rate to the determination ofthe UDI value is one month (plus
two days). 6 Having thus arrived at the value ofUDI 25 + 1 UDI 10 + 2 is
calculated as UDI 25 + 1(1ht + v2ht)• In between, the daily percentage
changes in the UDI values that must be announced on the 25th of
each month for the succeeding 13 to 16 days, leading to day 10 ofthe
next month, are again required to be constant.
The Mexican consumer price index rose 7% during 1994 (from
December 1993 to that of 1994), 52% during 1995, and 28% during
1996 (BdM, 1997, p. 251). Later in 1997, the monthly rate ofinflation
returned to values below 1%. Hence, there have been large changes in
the rate ofinflation over a short period oftime. Such changes are not
recognized immediately under lagged-momentum indexation which
refers to lags in allowing for changes in the rate of inflation rather
than for changes in the price level, as already explained. In Mexico,
6 Calculatedin the same way, the lagin the updating oftheinflation rate in Chile, although
nearly as short as practicable with monthly, rather than bi-monthly, ci’i data (as noted by
Fontaine, 1994, p. 223), is almost twice as long. In Chile, the ci’i reported by the fifth of each
month for the previous month is not used for redetermining the momentum ofindexation until
after the ninth of each month, while in Mexico the use from the time ofrelease is immediate.
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however, the lag in picking up changes in the rate of inflation is as
short as the twice-monthly CPI release dates allow.
4.2. TIPS
The nominal value of these securities is adjusted daily from the day
they are first issued but at the rate of price change observed several
months earlier. The lagged rate of price change is calculated from
values ofthe reference cpi whose dating and uses are explained below.
The monthly adjustment period mirrors the frequency ofthe U. S. cpi
which is monthly, rather than bi-monthly as in Mexico. However,
instead of beginning with the first day after the release of the CH
around the middle of each month, i.e., as soon as practicable as in
Mexico, the U. S. adjustment periods always start on the first of the
month. Furthermore, instead ofmaking the within-period adjustment
by constant daily percentage changes in the index basis, as is done in
Mexico, the U. S. interpolation procedure is linear, producing daily
inflation adjustments in the principal value that are ofequal absolute,
rather than relative, size within any month. 7
The reference cii for the first day ofany calendar month is the cpi
reported around 1-1/2 months earlier for the third preceding calendar
month. For example, the reference cpi for September 1, 1997 is the cpi
forJune that was reported at 8:30 a.m. on July 16 based on prices that
were sampled in the period June 1-25, mostly in the first half of the
month. The reference price for October 1, 1997 is the cri for July that
was reported on August 14. Then the inflation adjustment is such that
the current dollar value of the basis on October 1 relates to that on
September 1 as the seasonallyunadjusted cpi reportedfoJuly relates
to that reported for June. The inflation rate from one month to the
next (June to July) thus is applied during the month after next
(September). Hence the average lag in applying the current inflation
rate is 2-1/2 months in the United States, compared with just over
1 month in Mexico. Because the frequency of cpi reporting and of
changes in the rate of basis adjustment is half as large in the United
States as in Mexico, the minimum application lag in the United States
‘ When inflation is positive, linear rather than exponential adjustment of the principal
sum for inflation raises its real value most during the middle ofeach monthly adjustment period
compared with the correct exponential adjustment leading to the same monthly endpoint.
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would be only twice as long as the minimum application lag in Mexico,
in this case, 2 months. 8
Having established the value ofthe basis on the first day ofeach
oftwo adjoining months, the value ofthe basis on any day in between
is obtained by linear interpolation, in this case by adding 1/30 of the
difference for each day in September after the first until reaching
October 1.
Unlike the seasonally adjusted cii, the seasonally unadjusted cpi
(series cpi-u) is never revised, but this advantage may be outweighed
by disadvantages from imparting seasonal effects to reported yields. 9
The most obvious source of predictable variations in the real invest
ment value ofthe index is seasonal because the seasonally unadjusted
cpi contains known seasonal variations in the United States. Ah else
equal, a par-value investment in TIPS at a time when its current-dollar
par value has been propelled by lagged momentum indexation to a
seasonal high clearly has a predictably lower real yield than an
investment made at the same inflation-adjusted par value but at a
time when the seasonal factor reflected in the nominal par value is at
a low. For in the former case the investor would know that the coupon
and principal payments to be received will be based on a par value
embodying a lower seasonal component than the one reflected in the
current par value.
In addition, depending on the data-generation process subsumed,
8 This assumes roughly equal preparation lags in the United States and Mexico. The BLS
(1995, p. 1) reports that “the entire process of keying, reviewing, analyzing and publishing is
finished about 20 days after that last data are collected”. In Mexico, this lag is shorter since
publication occurs already 10 days after the end of the fortnight (quincena) to which the price
index refers. For instance, ifprices are collected mostly in the first week ofeach fortnight (though
food prices are known to be collected every week, see BdM, 1995c, p. 21), the average lag, from
the date the last prices are sampled to their reflection in published statistics, would be about
17 days.
To eliminate predictable seasonal changes in the real value of the inflation-adjusted
principal, use ofthe seasonally adjusted cr’i, as firstreported forany month, should be considered
forfuture TIPS issues. The seasonally adjusted CPi, unlike the seasonally unadjusted cPi, is widely
reported, but subsequently revised. Nevertheless, an index based on a series of seasonally
adjusted cpi values as first reported leaves the cvi free of expected seasonality if the annual
revisions in the seasonal adjustment factors are themselves unpredictable or minute. Because
the seasonal adjustment factors are revised retroactively each year with the release of the cpi
for January, use ofa “first-release”series for the seasonally adjusted ci’i could cause the monthly
inflation rate implied in that series for December to January to differ from the rate first reported
for that period by the BLS after applying the revised seasonal adjustment factor retroactively to
the cvi for December. This cost may be worth the benefit ofeliminating predictable seasonality
from the index. The relevant federal regulations (U. S. Government, 1997, p. 342) already provide
for index contingencies: “Ifa previously reported cpi is revised, Treasury will continue to use the
previously reported cvi in calculating the principal value and interest payments”.
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the latest monthly inflation rates, even if devoid of any seasonal
pattern, would not by themselves be the best predictor of the, as yet
unreported, current and future inflation rates except under the as
sumption that the monthlyinflation rate ofa country is difference-sta
tionary, rather than largely stationary as we assume. Given that a
growing number ofcountries implicitly or explicitly target a low level
of inflation, it is unlikely that inflation is appropriately represented
as predominantly a random walk or as subject to a diffusion process.
Rather, the price level will be a random walk with a drift that is
contributed by a low underlying inflation rate under these circum
stances, as Evans and Wachtel (1993) have suggested for the most
recent years in their study. Such a description would be apt ifperma
nent supply shocks to the level ofsustainable output arise randomly,
and the reaction to such shocks by the monetary authorities is ex
pected to be passive or neutral so that the price level, but not the
inflation rate, may be permanently disturbed. Ifspecial non-recurring
factors can be identified that contribute to transitory disturbances of
the inflation rate, automatic extrapolation of the most recent experi
ence thus would not be warranted.
We will show formally in one of the next sections that if future
inflation rates can be expected to differ from past inflation rates that
figure in the indexation process, the market value ofa security would
not be at par even though this is what substituting R = C in equations
(4) and (5), which do not allow for predictable changes in the real value
of inflation-adjusted principal, imply. Hence the true R is misrepre
sented by its prior calculation in real terms that makes no reference
to the indexation procedure actually applied. This makes the degree
ofinflation protection afforded by TIPS relative.
The next three sections provide analyses of the tliiFee sources of
indexation risks and of biases that follow predictably from known
events. Neglectingthem canproduceinaccuracies in theyield reported
on TIPS which we refer to as biases. The risks to which holders of
inflation-indexed securities are exposed from actual and impending
changes in the statistical procedures used by the government to
calculate the size of price index movements are discussed only in the
concluding section of this paper. To the extent these much-discussed
changes lead to any unexpected statistical depression of indexation
benefits, they are tantamount to a capital levy on TIPS.
Conditional Indexation Bias in Yields Reported
5. Biases Arising From a Predictable Seasonal
Component in Monthly Price Movements
Before deriving the seasonal bias factors mathematically, it is useful
to picture this bias with the help ofthe stylized seasonal pattern of a
trendlessparvalue shown in Figure 1. Consideran inflation protection
security which was issued at time (0) when the seasonal adjustment
factor was at a neutral level of 100. To illustrate a case ofconditional
underindexation, investors buy the security at a later time (P) when
the seasonal contribution to the price level, identified by the seasonal
adjustment factor reported by the Bureau ofLabor Statistics (BLs) for
the ci-u — U. S. City Average — All Items, is at a peak.’°
Rather than being a data plot, the scaling and pattern shown in
Figure 1 are therefore grossly simplified and made continuous to
illustrate the basic point that the relation of the seasonal position
reflected in the par value at time of purchase to that expected for ah
remaining (coupon and principal) pay-out dates determines whether
overindexation or underindexation is in prospect. Specificafly, the
figure showsthatifthe inflation-protectionsecurity is bought at atime
when its par value, determined by the past momentum ofthe seasonal
adjustment factor, reaches a seasonal high of 101, the interest to be
earned on that security, in relation to this seasonally-elevated par
value, wilh fali short of the stated real coupon rate in 11 out of 12
months in which seasonal adjustment factors reflected in the price-ad
justed par value are below 101. In all these “grey” months, the securi
ty would be earning on less than 101 — on no more in fact than be
fore — and this would require a compensatory price reduction in the
real price to 100/101 = 0.9901 in relation to a par value of 1. This price
decline, viewed independently ofthe imperfections in the indexation
process that caused it, would lead to a rise in the reported real yield,
thereby imparting a seasonal pattern to that yield, even though its
required level has not changed at all.
‘°The 1996 values ofthe seasonal adjustment factorwhich have also been applied in 1997,
before revisions are made in each of 5 later years, are, from January to December (BLS, 1997,
p. 7): 99.806, 99.871, 100.064, 100.128, 100.064, 100.000, 99.936, 99.936, 99.937, 100.000,
99.874, 99.623. The average of these 12 monthly factors is 99.937. The average actual value of
these seasonal adjustment factors is below 100 on account of Jensen’s inequality, and their
amplitude from peak to trough is less than 0.6, with a low in December and a high in April in
most recent years. The new seasonal factors for 1997 (with the 1997 values applied also to 1998),
released February 20, 1998, were little changed from the aboye: 99.812,99.937, 100.125, 100.125,
100.000, 99.938, 99.938, 99.938, 99.938, 100.000, 98.815, 99.629.
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Figure 1. Predictable Adverse Seasonal Indexation Bias.





Time from Issue (O) and Purchase (P) to Maturity (M)
The shortfall in the base on which interest is paid is indicated by
comparison with the peak-to-peak line, AL, at level 101, which main
tains constancy ofthe real value ofA. In ah but one of 12 months, this
une is aboye the undulating curve representing the pkih of the sea
sonal adjustmentfactor and indexed parvalue. In addition, ifmaturity
falis into a month with a seasonal factor lower than the one reflected
in the current par value, there is an anticipated shortfall of indexa
tion in the repayment of principal. In Figure 1, those paying the par
amount of 101 at time P would know that the pay-back of principal
will be only 100 at maturity of this three-year security so that there
is an anticipated loss in real value of LM. The reason is that the sea
sonal pattern, and hence the seasonally unadjusted epi used for the
price adjustment of the par value, suggests seasonal deflation from
101 to 100, while the underlying inflation trend that concerns the
investor is perfectly fiat. That investor is interested in real wealth
accumulation and consumption smoothing rather than immediate
consumption. Clearly buing the same security at a par value reflect
ing a seasonal high can not afford as high a real yield as buying it at
a par value reflecting a seasonal low.
5.1. Calculation ofthe Seasonal Bias on TIPS
The seasonal bias factors, specified below, adjust the expected real
value of future pay-outs on a daily basis for any expected seasonal
indexation bias. The purpose ofthis adjustment is to eliminate measu
rement errors in the yield arising from the use of seasonahly unad
justed data in indexation.
Leaving the conceptual illustration with arbitrary numbers
aside, we now focus concretely on seasonal distortions of the indexa
tion factor that arise in connection with the semiannual coupon
payments and eventual repayment of inflation-adjusted principal on
the first ten-year TIPS issue. On this issue, the first payment and all
other odd-numbered coupon payments are due on July 15, six months
from the issue date or dated date, if different. The even-numbered
coupon payment dates, including the maturity date, fali on January
15, the dated date. The seasonal adjustment factors applied to ah
future coupon and principal payments to calculate adjusted real yields
for 1997 are those first reported for 1997 in January of that year
because any revisions in these factors that will be announced in
subsequent years are viewed as unexpected.”
To compare the relative seasonal position ofthe indexedparvalue
used to determine the size ofthe coupon payments and ofthe principal
payment with the seasonal position embodied in the same security
purchased on day d ofmonth t, we first construct three geometrically
interpolated seasonal adjustment factors that make reference to the
dated date (t*, d*) or the current date (t, d). The first such seasonal
adjustment factor(s) applies to the odd-numbered coupon payments
due in montht + 6, the second to the even-numbered semiannual
coupon payments and the principal payment due in month t’, and the
11 More precisely, the seasonal adjustment factors are recalculated in January (e.g., 1998)
ofeach year for the past five years (1993-1997). The seasonal factors obtained for the most recent
year (1997) then first are applied throughout the next year (1998) until the first revision early
the fo]lowing year (in January 1999). With the seasonal pattern for 1997 subject to three more
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third applies to the current date. D*, D**, and D are equal, in order,
to the number of days in either the coupon payment month
—t + 6
in formula (9) andt in formula (10) — or in the current month, t, as
in (11). Daily dates are needed because the seasonal component that
applies two to three months earlier is interpolated over the payment
month to the payment date, as are ah other elements ofthe seasonally
unadjusted cpi. We also need daily dates because we are comparing
the seasonal component of the future coupon or principal payment
relative to the seasonal factor at the time of purchase to determine
whether underindexation or overindexation is in store.
The seasonal adjustment factor that applies to odd-numbered
coupon payment dates is:
(odd)SAF 1 .
* 6,d = SA.F 1 .
+ 3 (SAE 1 . +4 /SAF 1 .
+ )d
— 1)113*
Since the first 10-year TIPS issue was in January,t + 3 refers to April
andt + 4 to May in the formula aboye. Hence, using the factors given
in footnote 11, the seasonal adjustment factor reflected in the odd
numbered coupon payments on July 1512 is 100.128(100.064/
100.128)’’’ = 100.099092.
The seasonal factor that applies to even-numbered payment
dates, including principal repayment, is:
(even)SAF 1 , = SAF 1 . (SAF 1 .
—2 /SAF 1
— —
Sincet — 3 is October andt — 2 November in the scheme
aboye, the seasonal adjustment factor reflected in the even-numbered
coupon payments and in the principal balance due a, maturity is
100.000(99.874I100.OOO)’’3’ = 99.943077.
The seasonal factors applying to the various components ofpay
outmust be related to the factor applying on a given (investment) date,
d, ofinterest in month t which is:
(current)SAF d = SAF 1 (SAF 1.JSAF 1
- 3)(d- 1)/D
The respective seasonal indexation bias factors, SBF that apply
12 The actual auction date of the first 10-year TIPS note was January 29, 1997, dated
January 15, 1997, with regular coupon payment dates ofJanuary 15 and July 15, and maturity
ofJanuary 15, 2007.
to odd-numbered and even-numbered coupon payments together with
principal repayment for in investor at time (t, d) then are:
(odd)SBF 1 . + 6,d* it. a = SA.F 1 .
+
+4 /SAF ‘)1a*
— 1)/13*/ t +3’
SAFE 3 (SAF 1
—2 /SAF 1
— )(d - 1)/13
(even)SBF 1 d* ltd = SAF 1 . (SAF. —2 /SAF 1 .
—3 )(a* — 1)/D** /
SAF 1 (SAF 1 -2 /SAF 1
- )(d - 1)/D
To illustrate, this time a seasonal overindexation bias, assume
(t, d) is February 1, 1997 (ignoring that this was a Saturday and thus
not an actual trade date). With d = 1, formula (11) directs us to the
seasonal adjustment factor three months earlier, which is 99.874 for
November. To find out the seasonal adjustment factor for the date of
the first coupon payment, July 15, formula (9) requires the seasonal
adjustment factors three and two months earlier. These are 100.128
for April and 100.064 for May. Because d* is 15 and D* = 31 days, the
geometric average of these two values with exponent 17/3 1 for April
and 14/3 1 for May yields 100.099092 as already deduced. Hence the
seasonal bias factor from formula (12) is 100.099092/99.874 =
1.002254. This means simply that because prices in November tend to
be seasonally depressed compared with March-April, an investor on
February 1 who knows the seasonal pattern conveyed through lagged
momentum indexation can look forward to the coupon payments due
each July 15 as being 0.2254% larger in relation to the seasonahly
depressed par amount invested, than the real yield calculation sub
suming perfect simultaneous indexation without predictable bias
would suggest. Clearly if the 10-year note were always available at
par, the seasonal bias fromlagged-momentum indexationwould cause
the real yield to fluctuate. Conversely, the price of the security, in
percent ofpar, would have to fluctuate for the real yield to be constant.
The value of the seasonal bias factor from formula (13) for the
same February 1 purchase is 99.943077/99.874 = 1.000692. Because
this value applies both to even-numbered coupon payments and to
repayment of principal at maturity, it carnes progressively more
weight as the maturity date comes closer, compared with the factor
applicable to odd-numbered coupon payments. Hence the composite
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the monthly seasonal adjustment factors ofthe cri do not change from
year to year.
We now turn to the calculation of present values adjusted for
seasonal bias factors. Taking account ofseasonal indexation bias on the
evaluation date (t, d), and using (1 + hR) 2 as the discountfactorforevery
other (odd-numbered or even-numbered) half-yearly coupon payment,
the sum ofthe discounted coupon payments from equation (2) is:
SDCSd = {hC + (C/[R(2 + hR)]) [1 — (1 +hR)( 2 )]}SBFt*+ 6 d*Itd (2a)
+ {(1 + hR)(C/[R(2 + hR)]) [1 — (1 + hR)1}SBFtd*Itd
This calculation discounts the coupon payments to the next coupon
payment date, such as July 15, 1997 and then January 15, 1998, and
accounts for ah odd- and even-numbered coupons. Nexttaking account
of the seasonal indexation bias shared with even-numbered coupon
payments, and discounting to the time ofthe next coupon payment, as
before, the present value ofprincipal repayment from equation (3) is:
DPS d = (1 + hR)(’)SBF*d,It a.
Using the exponential formula for ADF that is given in equation
(7) for discounting from the date ofthe next coupon payment back to
the evaluation date, and substituting U. S. parameters in expression
(8) for accrued interest, Al, the appropriate calculation ofthe realyield
on TIPS, R, now requires solution ofthe equation:
1VlV,d = [(SDCS + DPS)/ADF
— AIltd
With seasonal indexation bias now recognized on the right side of
equation (la), the observed real market value or purchase price, MV,
on the left-hand side, is expected to depend in a predictable manner on
the valuation or purchase date as well as on the issue date of TIPS.
6. Indexation Bias from Largely Transitory
Disturbances in Seasonally-Adjusted Inflation
Let lagged-momentum indexation, as practiced with TIPS, be indicated
by rates of price change being calculated with price indexes applying
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up to three months before the time of issue in month t. Taking the
nominal stream of coupon payments discounted at a nominal factor
and the discountedvalue ofprincipal due n semiannual coupon periods
from the time ofissue and then canceling out overlapping segments of
the respective price ratios yields:
MV = [(E’ -3 )(EP +JE P)C/21/[( 1 + R/2)(EP */E Pi)] +
ftEP/P
-3 )(EP +JE P)(C/2)1/[( 1 + RJ2) 2 (EP +1 JE P)1 +
+ R/2Y , or
MV = (14)
{(C/2)[(1 + R/2)-’ + (1 + R/2)- 2 + ...
+ [(Es P+ 6 _ 3 )](1 + R12)}.
Hence even ifthere is no reason to thinkthat the three-month infiation
rate for anydistantfuture period will be differentfromthat foranother
such period (cf. Mussa, 1976), so that the expected price ratios in the
last two unes aboye are identical, MV, with R = C, will not be 1 but:
IVIVR_c = IBF.
IBF thus represents the Infiation Bias Factor refiected in the market
value at time t relative to 1.
Forthe firsthalfofeach month, the quarterlygross infiationrates
appearing in equation (15) are separated into known and expected
gross monthly infiation rates as shown below
IBFL =(EP/P 3 ) /(EP+/EP+ 3 ) =
([E(P/P_ /(EP+ 6 tEP÷ 3 )
In the first half of any month t, before the monthly cri release date,
only the ratioPJP 3 is known in the numerator of IBF. We will
assume that ah expected seasonally adjusted monthly infiation rates
are the same, so thatE[P_ 1 /P 2 1 = E[PIP_ 1 1 = (EP+/EP+ 3 )” 3 and
that the term structure of the expected infiation rate was fiat in the
United States in 1997. Nevertheless, the level ofthat expected rate of
infiation is informed to a degree (1-X) — later consistently assumed to
be 0.2857 — by current observations of the preceding gross infia
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E(PL f’t-2) = XE1 (PfP 3 ) + (1
—X)(P 2 /P). Now the value ofIBF
for the first day, d = 1, ofany month, t, when information on the cpi for
the previous month is not as yet available, is:
IBFtddj = (P 1 JP 13 )/(E 1 P+/E P ‘“ =
t t+3’
[XE_ 1 (P 1 JP_ 3 )/(P_ 2 /P_ 3 ) + (1 — X)] —1
As the cii release date in month t approaches, the relevance of
the more distantmonthlyrate,(PJP), begins to diminish sincethis
gross rate of inflation will continue to contribute to the indexation
process only until the first ofthe upcoming month. From the 8:30 a.m.
release date to the first ofthe next month, the day at whichP 3 ceases
to contribute to the momentum ofindexation, 1 plus the inflation rate
over 2 months,P 11 /P, rather than 1 month,PJP 3 is known in
the numerator of equation (15a) within the indexation horizon. Af
ter the first of month t + 1 and until the next cpi release date in that
month, the gross inflation rateP 1 /P 2 remains as the only known
rate still relevant for the imminent application ofthe index.
Onlyprospective, and not past, indexation gains or losses can bias
the current yield reported on TIPS and cali for a correction ofthat yield.
From the first day ofany month t to the day before release ofP 1 around
the middle of month t, there is relatively little advance information
available for identifying any temporary disturbance that may be con
tained in each successive monthly report ofinflation that will stil affect
indexation. For this first part ofeach month, the formula for IBF is:
As advance information is used up, the exponent in the aboye
equation declines daily during the first half of that month from the
first day (d = 1) to the last day prior to that cpi release date. From
the release date on and for the rest ofthe month, two monthly devia
tions from the underlying rate ofinflation can be identified that may
cause a predictable change in the real value ofprincipal on account of
lagged-momentum indexation. The value ofIBF from the release date
around the middle ofeach month to the first day ofthe next month is:
IBFtddreleasedate =P.E 1 _1 (P_jP_ 3 )/(P 1 _jP 13 ) + (1 — —ID—(d— 1)1/O
+ (1 —
—1
To illustrate: If a month has D = 30 days and the release date of
the CPI for the previous month falls on the l6th so that d = 16, the
exponent is 15/30 = 0.5 because exactiy halfofthe monthly indexation
remains to be applied over the second half of the current month. By
the first ofthe next month the exponent on the first factor on the right
of equation (15d) has fallen to 0. As this factor moves beyond the
indexation horizon on the first day ofthe new month, the second factor
moves up within the indexation range. Thus on the first day ofthe new
month the exponent on the second factor, which is now the first and
sole surviving factor, is 1 for the last time. It then starts to decline as
the number of days remaining in the new month (in the numerator)
falls below D’ = 31 (inthe denominator). The formula forthe remaining
dates ofthe new month, t + 1, before the next cpi release date, thus is
an update of (15c) with D’ replacing D:
IBF 1
+ id d <release date in month t + i = [2E(P 1
—l1t _2»”
+ (1 — ?.)1 —ID’—(d— 1)]/D’
As aiready pointed out in Section 2, laggedmomentum indexation
allows the investor to know the indexation for varying lengths oftime
ahead. Lead time shrinks from 11/2 months on the release date to 1/2
month on the day before the next release date. This variable amount
offoreknowledge ofthe consequences forfuture indexation applies also
to any inflation outliers.
Both equations (15c) and (15d) involveE_ 1 [PLJP 3 ], and (15d)
and (15e) involve E[P 1 1 /Pi 21 We now estimate these terms by taking
the gross inflation rate of the six months just prior to the indexation
horizon. Hence the pattern, shown for these two expressions, is:
E 1 {P 2 /P 3 ] = [(PJP )lcil6. E [P 1 /P 1 2] = [(PJP ‘1 (16) 1—9 i ‘ t
Concretely this means that to estimate the inflation rate ex
pected, say in March 1997, to have prevailed fromJanuary to February
of that year, we use information for July 1996 through January 1997
(15b)
(15d)




(1 — ))] —[D—(d—1)]/D
(15e)
(15c)
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before the price index for February 1997 is released. Once it is
released, we can then compare expected and actual outcomes for
inflation and what to make of any difference.
If a country is known to be taking growing inflation risks, a> 1
would be an appropriate choice, while a < 1 would be suitable for a
country engaged in a credible program to reduce inflation or ifsurveys
of informed opinion indicate that inflation is expected to decline. For
1997-1998, however, we take a = 1 and substitute [(P/P_ 9 )]’ 6 for
E 1 [PJP 3 ] and[(P 1 _JP 18 )] 116 for E[P1 fP 2 ] in equations of type
(15c) or (15d) to obtain actual measures ofIBF d• 13
Transiated into forecasts ofthe net inflation rate, the persistence
implications ofthe six-month moving average process assumed aboye
are these: The retrospective forecast of the most recently revealed
monthly net rate ofinflation, 1n(P1 /P 2 ), is used to identify the
innovation or error term,E 11 , in that rate. Based on a six-month
average ofimmediatelyprior inflation, the underlyingrate ofinflation,
E(it 11 ), was estimated as ln((P 12 /P 8 )”9 before the price indexP 1
was reported, so that:
E 1 (;_) = (1/6) ; =n 2 —(5/6) Ait 2
—(4/6) Ait, 3 — (3/6) An 4
— (2/6) An 5 — (1/6) A7t 16 .
Hence, the largely transitory innovation is:
=
— E(n 11 ) = A; + (5/6) An 2 +
(4/6) An 3 + (3/6) An 14 + (2/6) An + (1/6) n 6 .
As expression (18) makes clear through the unitary coefficient on
the expectations process contains a unit root though the perma
nently active component of a one-time disturbance, previously identi
13 The derivation ofinputs for this calculation is shown in Table 1 available upon request.
In its last column it is convenient to present (Pt — 2/Pl — 3)/El — i(Pt — 2/Pl 3) = (Pt — 2/Pt — 3)/i(Pt —
P 1 )]1/6 as Pt — z/{Pt — 3(Pt — 3/Pt
— 9)1/6] where the denominator (in braces) of Pt —2 represents the
expected value ofPt -2, which is obtained by applying the average monthly gross inflation factor
for the prior six months to Pt_3. Similarly, the second factor in equation (15d) is estimated as
Pt — i/{Pt — 2(Pt — 2/Pt
— 8)1/6) as soon as Pt —1 has been released in month t, so that only updating
is involved.
fied as (1 — )i, is low. The effect of any single-pulse disturbance
eventually stabilizes at between 28% and 29%’ of the size of that
disturbance in the present scheme. This percentage broadly conforms
to the Fama and Gibbons’ (1984, p. 329) finding that only about 20
percent of the unexpected inflation rate in any one month is incorpo
rated into the inflation rate expected for the next month. Lastly,
although it could be consistent with a recommendation earlier in this
report to use the seasonally adjusted cpi as first reported for 1996 and
not as reported with the first retroactive revision of the seasonal
adjustment factors in 1997, we use the best data available at the
inception of TIPS to estimate IBF. This means recourse to the data
reported from January 1997 on.
The adjustment ofthe real yield by means ofthe indexation bias
factor is simpler to apply than with the seasonal bias factor. IBF,
unlike SBF, corrects for an expected percentage change in the real par
value which is the same for ah future payments of coupons and
principal. It therefore appears simply as a multiplicative factor in the
basic market value formula:
6.1. Illustration ofIndexation Bias
from a Dip in Recently-Reported Inflation
An illustration may help visualize how and when there may be
prospective indexation bias. When the price level is expected to be a
random walk with steady drift, the underlying inflation rate can be
treated as a constant to which actual month-by-month inflation, when
disturbed by unpredictable temporary factors, soon will return. Even
ifthe inflation rate also contains a small element of random walk so
that the return to the status quo ante is incomplete as here assumed,
indexation bias in the calculation ofthe reported real rate ofyield may
be predicted by the extent to which the most recently reported rate of
inflation differs from the underlying rate. Any such occurrence would
bias prospective indexation on account of lags in that process away




= [IBF(SDCS + DPS)/ADF — AI] 1 ,d. (ib)
(18)
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Figure 2. Adverse Nonseasonal Indexation Bias.
Bias occurs, on account of lagged-momentum indexation, as soon as a
temporary unexpected dip in inflation has been recognized.
Term to Maturity (M)
D
E
from the maintenance ofthe real value ofinvestments but only for as
long as the new information affects prospective indexation.
Figure 2 helps explain exactly how the bias arises and for how
long it is operative after a particular event. It shows a temporary
slowing of the inflation rate that causes the price path to follow the
trajectory ABRF, instead of continuing from B to C and D along
the nominal-value curve that rises at a constant rate of inflation.
Curve segment RF reflects almost the same underlying inflation rate
as the curve with constant price level growth, AB, as the observed dip
in the inflation rate will have only a small impact of (1-X) times the
inflation surprise on the expected permanent future rate ofinflation.
If GH, which is equal to ‘FIL, is the length of lag in the inflation rate
applied to adjust the nominal par value, that value follows the path
ACEF. Thus lagged-momentum indexation would cause the par value
ofa security to continue to follow the upwards curving path reflecting
the original inflation rate right up to point C.
If any temporary change in the inflation rate is unanticipated
until fully reported at time H, there is no predictable indexation bias
for or during the episode, of length GH, of unusually low inflation.
There is only an ex post gain in the real par value ofthe security since
that value goes from GB to HC, rather than to HR which is all that
would be required to maintain the real value of an investment of GB
ex post. If the deviation of the inflation rate from the underlying
inflation rate is expected to be end as soon as it is fully reported at
time H, then there is an expected real indexation loss at that time as
the parvalue ofHC is expected to rise onlyto LE ratherthan to LN, the
value required to keep real value intact in view of the return of
inflation to its (slightly modified) underlying rate. Hence the loss
of real value in prospect on account of lagged momentum indexation
on an investment of HC at time H is equal to EN, yielding an indexa
tion bias factor as an adjustment to principal equal to (LE/LN) < 1.
What is thestory behind the prospective underindexation in this
instance? An investor purchasing the security at a par value ofHC at
time H will have observed a temporary reduction in the rate of
inflation by that time but conclude correctly that the previously
established inflation trend, in large part (X = 0.7143), with resume.
Hence the investor will realize that instead ofheading from C in the
direction of D, as would be required to keep up with correctly anti
cipated inflation, lagged indexation will make the par value follow
the jagged course to F via point E. Interest will not be earned on the
underindexation indicated by the vertical difference between curve
segments CD and CEF, and repayment of principal at maturity will
be underindexed by the amount FD in this example.
Once any temporary fluctuation in the inflation rate that causes
a permanent change in the price level has aged beyond the reach of
lagged indexation, there is no indexation bias in the measurement
of the real yield until a new fluctuation is reported that affects the
indexation in prospect. In Figure 2, for instance, the investor purchas
ing the security at time L at the par amount LE will get complete
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the amount invested. Only the investor paying par (of HC) at time H
would be misinformed by the way in which reported real yields are
calculated as if they were independent of the imperfect indexation
procedure actually applied rather than compensating for predictable
effects ofimperfections that have been activated by events.
7. Indexation Biases Arising
from Anticipated Future Changes in the Measured
Inflation Rate
Because oflagged-momentum indexation, predictable changes in real
value can also arise from deviations in the rate of basis adjustment
fromthat required to maintain constancy ofreal value on a currentba
sis. Such deviations can be anticipated whenever future rates of
inflation are expected to differ from current rates.
Surveys of inflation expectations taken in 1996-1997 did not
indicate that the rate of inflation expected for the future differs
appreciably from the then current level of 2 to 3 percent per annum
at either long or short forecasting horizons.’ 5 Particularly in develop
ing countries with mixed stabilization success, however, changes in
fiscal and political control and in the monetary-policy and exchange
rate regime can sometimes be anticipated. Mexico, for instance, has
pursued a determined policy ofgettingthe inflationrate down to single
digits to levels at least as low as the 7 percent last observed during
1994. Lagged momentum indexation will leave the real value of
principal permanently elevated when the underlying rate ofinflation
is expected to fail and to remain lower than before.Aware of this
impending benefit, reported yields would fail when siich an expecta
tion arises even when the required real rate ofreturn is unchanged.
Ofcourse ifthe fail in the reported rate ofinflation, as now in the
United States, is due in part to formula and sampling revisions
For instance, the 1-year (10-year) ahead forecast of CPI inflation obtained quarterly (1
through IV) from the survey of professional forecasters by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia (phil.frb.orgleconlspfYcpiel.dat and cpiel0.dat) for 1996-1 through 1997-111 is: 2.78
(3.00), 2.88 (3.00), 3.00 (3.00), 3.03 (3.00), 3.08 (3.00), 3.00 (2.85), 2.85 (3.00). Ml of these
estimates fail into a range barely more than a quarter percent wide. For an evaluation of the
Survey ofProfessional Forecasters see Croushore (1993). Even ifintended as forecasts ofmeasured
rather than “true” inflation, these forecasts are unlikely to reflect that scheduled changes in
statistical procedures alone had served to depress measured inflation by 0.4 percentage point per
annum by 1998 compared with the status ofstatistical procedures applied prior to 1997.
loweringthe inflation deduced from any given change in the economy’s
set of prices, rather than fo genuinely lower rates ofincrease in these
prices, there is ac.a 1 inuing effect, beyond lagged-momentum index
ation, that works the other way. Any expected systematic underindexa
tion in comparison with current cii estimation methods would lead to
a compensating rise in the reported real yield as soon as the prospect
ofBLS-produced underindexation, relative to the status quo, becomes
firm. Since there would be no appreciable BLS effect on the nominal
interest rate, those who interpret the difference between an otherwise
comparable nominal interest rate and the real rate on TIPS as the
expected inflation rate could erroneously conclude that expected infla
tion, and notjust reported inflation, has “really” fallen.’ 6
While the indexation bias ofthe previous section was developed
against a background of steady underlying inflation, that rate may
itself be expected to change. Of course if the inflation rate were a
random walk without drift, no change in the future inflation rate could
ever be anticipated at the time of an investment in TIPS. Because the
inflation rate expected for the future would then always be equal to
the latest reading, predictable underindexation or overindexation
could not arise. However, ifthere were reasons to expect, for instance,
that future inflation rates generally will be lower than the most recent
rates of inflation, perhaps because the new government, say of a
developing country, has announced a credible stabilization program
ofmonetary and fiscal restraint or adopted a currency-board arrange
ment, predictable overindexation would arise. Conversely, ifthe gov
16 Inferences derived from interest-rate comparisons themselves beg many questions and
have no proof-value in this regard. Emmons (1997) has inferred from a decline in the spread
between the 10-year conventional U. S. Treasury yield and the 10-year TIPS yield and from a
similar decline in the term-structure spread between the 10-year and the 3-month conventional
Treasury yield that could be observed from late April to late July 1997 that the average annual
rate ofinflation expected over a 10-year horizon declined by as much as 75 basis points over such
a short period. However, interest-rate based models have had rather limited success in forecas
ting inflation (Hafer and Hein, 1985; Mishkin, 1990). For example, ifnominal interest rates rise
and real interest rates fali when there is increased uncertainty about inflation but no change in
its expected level (see Lahiri, Teigland, and Zaporowski, 1988), the Irving Fisher procedure
erroneouslyregisters an increase in the expected rate ofinflation by falsely attributing the action
of the second moment under risk aversion to the first.
Barr and Campbell (1997) find that the leveis of real rates and expected inflation start
out correlating negativelyat short horizons, with the correlation becoming zero and then positive
as the horizon increases. They show that extraction ofthe term structure of expected inflation
rates from the term structure ofnominal interest rates is not as comparatively simple as it would
be if a liquidity premium and an otherwise constant, or at least inflation-independent, real
interest rato could be subsumed. Tzavalis and Wickens (1996) also found that the forecasting
ability of the term spread for futuro inflation is very poor.







Figure 3. Underindexation Due to a Coming Inflationary Regime
Change.




ernment were losing fiscal control and a rise in the monetization of
deficits loomed ahead, the expected inflationrate would, at sorne point,
be expected to rise well aboye the current rate. Because the starting
date of this adverse dynamic would be uncertain, a “peso problem”
would arise. The mere prospect ofsuch a regime change would result
in expected underindexation on account ofthe lagged inflationmomen
tum in the indexation factor used to update the par value ofinflation
protection securities.
Because constancy ofthe underlying inflation rate is never guar
anteed, categorical statements to the effect that “TIPS entail no infla
tion risk” (e.g., Sargent and Taylor, 1997), are too strong. Similarly,
Hetzel’s (1992, p. 13) statement that “because holders of the indexed
bonds are guaranteed payment representing a known amount of
purchasingpower, they do not have to forecast inflation” is misleading.
Since perfectly simultaneous indexation is unobtainable, such holders
can not in fact know what arnount of purchasing power indexed
instrument will deliver without reference to forecasted inflation rates
compared with the current rate. Furthermore, expected and unex
pected inflation and the factors that produce them can, of course, be
correlated either positively or negatively with the real yield required
on TIPS and hence with their market price.
Figure 3 illustrates the real-value effects ofapermanentinflation
shock by introducing a regime break characterized by a maintained
increase in the rate of inflation at time G. If the break is fully
anticipated at time G, before the higher inflation rate is actually
revealed in faster advance of the price level, there is anticipated
underindexation from the prospect of following the indexation path
BCF instead of the constant-real value path BD from point B. Ifthe
regime change was a known possibility but not a certaiñty, the degree
of anticipated underindexation is less. In either case, however, the
market price ofTIPS would fail below the indexed par value in the span
ofthe une segment BC, only to rejoin the solid line representing that
value at point C.
Once again, only prospective overindexation or underindexation
can affect the real price of TIPS relative to its real par value and with
itthe correct calculation ofthe realyield fromcurrentpricequotations.
Because curve segment CF embodies the same inflation rate as seg
ment BD, the investor at time H will get exact real-value maintenance
in the par value from time H on. Thus there is no conditional indexa
tion bias at that point provided that the inflation rate continues
F
A
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Term to Maturity (M)
without further change at the higher level, as presented in Figure 3.
Yet the investorwho has heid the security since time G and who bought
at a price that did not allow forthe impendingregime change will have
experienced a real indexation loss between time G and H that is not
recouped.
178 179George M. von Furstenberg cind Michael T. Gapen Conditional Indexation Bias in Yields Reported
8. Conclusions and Assessment
The risk-free real interest rate is an important anchor for portfolio
valuation modeis. It is often assumed implicitlythatthe long-term real
interest rate appearing as part ofthe user cost of capital in modeis of
private investment, for instance in the Is sector ofthe economy, is free
of default risk. Hence it is easy to seize on the real yield on TIPS as
finally providing a more certain revelation of “the” real interest rate
than hitherto available.
A number of studies have already pointed out that the informa
tion benefits ofhaving such a market series ofreal yields available are
not as great as crude identifications might have led us to suppose.
Fisher (1997) has explained why it is impermissible to interpret the
yield that remains after subtracting the expected rate ofinflation — a
residual which is Irving Fisher’s ex ante real rate — as the same as
the yield on a real bond and why, conversely, subtracting the yield on
a real bond from the yield on a nominalbond is not sufficient to identify
the expected rate of inflation. Greenspan (1992) and researchers
from the Bank of Canada (Cóté et al., 1997) have provided useful
cautions in this regard. Fisher (1997) has shown that expected infla
tion can not, in general, be extractedfrom real and nominal bond prices
alonejust as expected exchange-rate depreciation can not, in general,
be extracted from foreign or domestic bond prices or international
interest rate differentials (see Engel, 1996; Kamin, 1997).17 Garrison
and White (1997), Sóderlind and Svensson (1997), and Bernanke and
Woodford (1997) have developed insightful modeis and appraisals.
The yield on TIPS clearly does not define “the real interest rate”
pervading the economy as it does the “is” schedule of undergraduate
textbooks. Instead it is the yield on a particular, imprétisely indexed
government financing instrument whose relation to “the” riskless real
rate, in any ofits possible manifestations and derivations, remains to
be examined. In addition, the real yields reported are calculated with
the assumption ofperfect simultaneous indexation as ifthat the real
17 Even ignoring the heterogeneity ofinstrument construction, tax status, and indexation
in the real bonds issued by different central governments around the world, we therefore doubt
that comparison oftheir real yields will do much to “shed light on the market’s expectations as
to the future course ofvarious bilateral real exchange rates” (Summers, 1997, p. 4). Nevertheless
we favor international standardization of real bonds using the best available design features to
lower information costs and to minimize various sources of indexation bias and the attendant
risks to the real par value.
value ofthe inflation-adjusted principal could always be expected to be
fixed when on a current basis. This, however, is not the case because
predictable indexation biases exist.
Our study has suggested adjustments that would make the
reported real yield that is subject to economic analysis more accurate
so that it is, infact, the internal rate ofreturn afforded by a real stream
of expected payouts. Those payouts may be affected by predictable
changes in the real value ofprincipalwhich reported yield calculations
have ignored. We therefore conceptualized and quanified imperfec
tions in indexation and sorne of their expected effects on reported
yields. These yields must be expected to have a seasonal component
because they are calculated without allowing for predictable seasonal
changes in the real value of a principal that is indexed to the lagged
rate ofchange in the seasonally unadjusted cpi. Each monthly report
ofthe seasonally adjusted cii also is hable to affect the reported yield
to the extent changes in the last reported monthly inflation rate from
its earlier average level contain more noise than signal about future
inflation rates. For in that case the latest report of inflation may
contribute to an identifiable prospect oflagged-momentum indexation
differing from the expected value ofthe currently ongoing, but not as
yet observable, inflation rate. Finally, news about long-term inflation
trends and targets or about the procedures used to measure infla
tion will have an immediate impact on the level ofreported yields.
The effects quantified daily over the first trading year ofthe first
TIPS issue were:’ 8
i) Over the first year of trading, adjustment for predictable
seasonal bias changes the yield by varying amounts ranging from
+ 4 basis points in late February and early March to — 3 basis points
in early November on the first TIPS issue examined.
ji) The adjustment for the inflation bias factor at first raises the
yield very slightly and then lowers it by a maximum of3 basis points
later in the first coupon period, because temporary surprises in the
seasonally adjusted inflation rate were mainly on the downside.
Lagged-momentum indexation then produces predictable underin
dexation because the current rate ofinflation is expected to be higher
‘ 5 The daily reported yield rates and the adjustments thereto are given inTable 2 available
upon request (6 pages). The adjustments to the daily yields reported in the Wall Street Journal
were calculated with the closing prices ofthe first issue ofTIPS also reported daily in that source,
and with the monthly seasonal adjustment factors and seasonally adjusted and not seasonally
adjusted monthly cpi-u data releases from the BLS.
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than the rate at which the par value will be adjusted. During the
second coupon period, the adjustment for the inflation bias factor
alternates between lowering and raising the yield with a maximum
change of 1 basis point in either direction. The reason was that the
inflation rate was extremely low and steady over this stretch.
As shown in Figure 4, ah these adjustrnents combined happen to
be largely offsetting for the first TIPS issue. Over its first trading year,
from the first trading date on January 29, 1997 to January 14, 1998,
the reported rate rises on balance, but with sorne ups and downs that
widen the range, frorn 3.37 to 3.71 percent, or by 34 basis points, while
the real yield with ah the adjustments increases from 3.38 to 3.69
percent, or by 31 basis points. The absolute difference between corre
sponding entries of the two series is never more than 5 basis points,
or less than 1.5 percent of their value. The range of variation of the
revised series is 49 basis points compared with 53 basis points in
the reported series, or 8 percent less.
Although the adjustrnents suggest that, over the first trading
year, the first TIPS issue could be expected to yield about what the
reported yield had suggested, the reporting bias, for other coupon
periods, or issues in other months, could be more pronounced and
one-sided. It could also be appreciably larger in developing countries.
There monthly inflation rates tend to be choppy on account ofdiscrete
adjustments in administered prices and minimumwages. Also, regirne
changes are more dramatic and speculations about them are reflected
in the capital and exchange markets, and seasonally sensitive prices,
particularly food prices, have a greater weight in the cii than in the
United States.
Like all debt instruments, TIPS are valued by forward-looking
investors so as to afford the yield they require from he stream of
payments expected on the instrument until maturity. To know what
stream to expect, large institutional investors and market makers can
not ignore the operation of seasonal factors, the outlook for inflation
compared with recent experience, or the prospect of statistical revi
sions in the cpi. Because imperfections in the indexation procedure
actuahly applied to TIPS follow predictably from known events or
conditions, these events must be monitored by TIPS-market specialists.
Details of statistical and indexation practice matter because the
indexation procedure actually applied and the correct calculation of
the real yield are inextricably linked and can not safely be separated.
Figure 4. Real Yield on TIPS with (1) Private Sector Formula and (2)
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8.1. Risks ofDefinitional and Procedural Changes Affecting
the Movement ofthe Price-Index
This lack of independence is contrary to what is assumed in tije
calculation of reported real yields. It also runs counter to Shiller’s
(1997, p. 210) advice that the public should be encouraged to write
contracts in terms of a “real dollar” or a “contract dollar,” rather like
the UF in Chile or the UDI in Mexico, “thereby cutting out the math
anxiety issue induced by index numbers, reframing the discussion
solidly in real terms”. Our advice, instead, would be to worry greatly
about the index numbers and real-to-nominal exchange rates put out
by government and the exact manner in which they are applied to
generate sorne measure ofreal-value maintenance.
In the United States, the Bureau ofLabor Statistics (BLs) in effect
administers the TIPS exchange rate whose course yields the lagged
momenturn in the seasonally unadjusted cri. At the same time, the
Secretary of the Treasury is the U. S. President’s, and the nation’s,
chief advisor on economic policy. Viewed in conjunction also with the
independent monetary authorities, the government as a whole thus
not only “makes” inflation but also its measure.
While we do not have any doubt that the BLS is interested only in
improving the accuracy of rneasuring inflation, the consequences of
doing so in a way that yields systematically lower reports of a given
rate ofinflation are neverthelessharmful to TIPS investors tothe extent
they did not anticipate such a change in statistical procedures. The
1996 Economic Report of the President (U. S. Couricil of Economic
Advisers, 1996, p. 73) already noted that “although true inflation is
expected to remain constant from 1996 onward, inflation measured by
the epi is expected to edge lower as revised procectures gradually
rernove the upward biases in current cii inflation figures. ci inflation
is likely to slow by 0.2 percentage point in 1997 ... and by another 0.1
percentage point [estimate since raised to 0.2 percentage pointi in
1998” as the BLS irnplements new procedures. Hence a good part ofthe
decline in reported inflation from 1996 to 1998 will be statistical and
not “real”.
Because the Boskin (1996) Commission Report recommended
changes in statistical procedure that would reduce the rate ofinflation
reported annually by as much as 1.1 percentage points a year, a “peso”
problem has arisen. New investors in TIPS will require higher yields
thanwarranted bycurrent statistical procedures until it is clearwhich
further statistical measures will be implemented. Hence the real yield
reported on TIPS may be quite far removed from the economic concept
of “the” real rate and specifics can not safely be ignored.
For example, if measures close to those recommended by the
Boskin Comrnission were adopted at the start of the year 2000 when
the first TIPS issue still has seven years to run, the exact same set of
price increases as would otherwise occur could be evidenced by a
reported inflation rate of 2 rather than 3 percent per annum merely
by changing the statistical looking glass. The effect would be the same
as imposing a capital levy of about 6.6 percent at maturity (5 to 6
percent in present value terms, including the growing levy on coupon
payments after January 2000). If such a levy would break into full
consciousness of TIPS investors all of a sudden, say around New Year
1999, the market price of TIPS on the next trading day would fali by 5
or 6 percent and the reported yield would rise instantly from, say, 3.5
percent by about 70 basis points, or by 20 percent in round numbers,
as progressive depreciation of the exchange rate between “real” and
nominal claims, starting in the year 2000, would now be anticipated.
The reason, however, would not be that the required real rate ofreturn
on TIPS has changed, but that a prospect of underindexation relative
to the previously expected maintenance of the statistical status quo
has opened up. Changes in that prospect would contribute to van
ations in reported yields and may have contributed both to the level
and the vaniability ofthose yields already.
The point of this example, as of the earlier calculations, is that
investors in TIPS can not rely on changes in real yields calculated
without reference to the indexation procedure as correctly identifying
the real yields they should expect to obtain unless they can afford
errors which may at times be large. We also provide the first quanti
fication ofthe measurement errors that can result from imperfections
or time-inconsistency in the indexation process, hoping thereby to
contribute to the intellectual seasoning ofthe issue.
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Rafael Gamboa*
Abstract: Mexico is a very centralized country mainly as a result of the
involvement ofthe federal government (FG) in functions thatwould be more
efflciently provided by subnational governments (sG). The concentration of
activities in the FG is the result of two institutional features: the unclear
legal assignment ofexpenditure functions across leveis ofgovernment, and
the assignment of sources of revenue that concentrates a larger share of
revenues in hands of the FG. In the presence of multiple uses of federal
transfers, and in the absence of information on the costs of providing SG
services, the FG has been reasonably reluctant to decentralize more func
tions. As long as the FG remains in control ofmost ofgovernment revenues,
it is important to ensure that the benefits from decentralization also accrue
to it. The transfer of functions should avoid SG neglect of those functions
that generate benefits to the rest ofthe country and keep control over the
size of transfers. One instrument that can achieve both objectives is a
widespread use of conditional grants.
Resumen: Las decisiones de la administración pública mexicana están
relativamentecentralizadas acausa de laparticipación del gobierno federal
(GF) en funciones que proveerían más eficientemente los gobiernos locales
(GL); esta situación se ha generado ante la poco clara asignación de funcio
nes entre niveles de gobierno y la concentración de fuentes de ingreso en el
ámbito federal. Al existir múltiples usos de las transferencias federales, y
poca información sobre los costos de realizarfunciones locales, es razonable
que el GF se muestre renuente a descentralizarfunciones, aunque reconoce
laventaja informativa que tienen los GL. Mientras el GF mantenga el control
* Banco de México. 1 wish to thank Raul Livas, John Quigley and Daniel Rubinfeld for
helpful suggestions. This paper was presented at the OECD-Brazil Seminar on Decentralization,
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, and Macroeconomic Governance, held in Brasilia on June
16-17, 1997. The comments of the participants to the seminar are gratefully acknowledged, as
well as those of two anonymous referees. Errors and opinions are my responsibility. The paper
was prepared before the creation ofthe Ramo 33 (Aportaciones a gobiernos estatales y munici
pales), which arethe kind oftransfers encouraged in this paper. Therefore this article has evolved
from a policy recommendation to an analysis ofthe advantages ofthese type of transfers.
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